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Rock Island Revisited: Black Hawk’s Life,
Keokuk’s Oratory, and the Critique of US
Indian Policy
Frank Kelderman
University of Louisville

In 1848 American newspapers announced the
death of Keokuk, a tribal leader of the Sauk Nation who had established
a reputation as one of the finest American Indian orators. The American painter George Catlin had painted his portrait several times and
found that there was “no Indian chief on the frontier better known at this
time, or more highly appreciated for his eloquence.”1 Historians, too, frequently praised Keokuk’s skills as a politician and orator: Caleb Atwater called him “a shrewd politic man, as well as a brave one,” Benjamin
Drake celebrated his “eloquence” and “sagacity,” and Thomas McKenney
commented on his “courage, prudence, and eloquence.” Keokuk was, in
McKenney’s words, “in all respects, a magnificent savage.”2 Of course,
good reputations have a way of eroding, and more than a century later
the historian Donald Jackson described Keokuk more skeptically as a
“smooth talker and a politician” who had aimed “to co-exist with the
Americans.” By contrast, the Sauk warrior Black Hawk—who challenged
Keokuk’s status as civil chief and mounted an important campaign of
resistance against the United States—stood out as a “bull-headed fighter
who chose a bitter last stand against extinction.”3 In critical commentary Black Hawk and Keokuk typically present a clear opposition. As
Thomas Burnell Colbert notes, while Black Hawk is remembered as “a
noble Native American leader trying to save his culture,” Keokuk is
typically dismissed as “a self-seeking sycophant” to the American
government.4
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Such appraisals undoubtedly have historical roots. At the conclusion
of the Black Hawk War in 1832, a fter settler volunteers had decimated
Black Hawk’s band of followers, the American government reaffirmed
Keokuk as the official liaison between the United States government and
the confederated Sauk and Meskwaki nations.5 This appointment rewarded him for having tried to keep peace with the settler population
flooding into the Mississippi River Valley, and for signing off on land cessions in exchange for annuities. By the time Black Hawk’s conflict with
white settlers came to a head in the late 1820s, Keokuk’s influence among
the Sauk had “cut deeply into the number of Black Hawk’s followers,” and
a majority of the nation did not pursue military action.6 When Black
Hawk published an account of the war in his autobiography Life of
Mà-ka-tai-me-she-kià-kiàk, or Black Hawk (1833), the story of his lost
campaign also presented a narrative about the loss of community coherence, due to the accommodationist influence of Keokuk.
To complicate what Alvin Josephy once named “the rivalry of Black
Hawk and Keokuk,” this essay situates Black Hawk’s autobiography in
the context of Keokuk’s oratory and the workings of Indian diplomacy
at the Rock Island agency, in present-day Illinois.7 A critical emphasis
on print publication has meant that literary studies have accessed
Keokuk almost exclusively through Black Hawk’s representation of him
in his memoirs, rather than through the manuscript records of his own
oratory. Yet Black Hawk’s Life of Mà-k a-t ai-m e-she-kià-kiàk was but
one of many collaborative publications from the Sauk Nation during this
time, which also included the oratory, petitions, and treaty councils in
which Keokuk participated.8 When seen alongside Black Hawk’s Life,
Keokuk’s speeches and councils challenge the tropes by which scholars
have made sense of how both tribal leaders rhetorically engaged federal
Indian policy and Sauk removal. Against critical interpretations that
have placed Keokuk and Black Hawk on opposing sides of a cultural-
political spectrum, I suggest that their respective publications critique
in overlapping ways the network of agents and traders who administered
Indian affairs in the Rock Island area. As both of them navigated communication circuits that included Native and non-Native coauthors,
amanuenses, and translators, Black Hawk and Keokuk took part in
textual collaborations that integrated oral performance, translation,
manuscript writing, and print publishing. T hese performances were
embedded in the diplomatic structures of the Indian agency at Rock Island and the Superintendency of Indian Affairs in St. Louis, but they also
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recorded sustained critiques of Indian policy as it was carried out by
American administrators.
Starting from this premise, this essay develops three related claims.
In the first section I argue that Black Hawk’s Life of Mà-ka-tai-me-she-
kià-kiàk was a collaborative publication that both enlisted and intervened in a network of traders and administrators at the Rock Island
Indian agency. Second, I argue that Keokuk’s speeches and petitions, addressed to administrators in the Office of Indian Affairs, constituted a
similar attempt to both employ and critique existing colonial networks,
by establishing a record of the policy failures of the imbricated networks
of white traders and US administrators. Finally, in the third section I argue that while Keokuk is often understood as accommodating American traders and settlers while boosting his own influence, his oratory
articulated a sustained response to the economic pressures that accelerated settler expansion and Indian removal in the Midwest. While Kekouk’s speeches were s haped by forms of collaboration and mistranslation
that shaped Indian diplomacy, they should nevertheless be taken seriously as import ant public discourse on the consequences of land encroachment and indigenous displacement during the era of removal.
Rather than a mere extension of US administrative networks, Keokuk’s
councils and speeches offered moments of institutional critique and intervention. At stake in this argument is not a desire to restore Keokuk’s
reputation or to recuperate his historical agency but rather to offer a perspective on removal-era indigenous oral performance beyond tropes of
resistance and accommodation.9 Writing and publishing are always acculturated activities, taking place, as Richard Brodhead puts it, in concrete cultural situations and a “landscape of institutional structures.”10
Black Hawk and Keokuk both critiqued the colonial bureaucracy by enlisting its communication circuits: as they navigated the technologies of
the Indian Office they used collaborative forms of publication to intervene in its operations.11 Seen together, their publications offer a fuller
understanding of indigenous writing that engaged with Indian removal
in the Old Northwest, as it was elaborated and contested at the Rock
Island Indian agency.
“Bad Management”: Black Hawk’s Life as Policy Critique

In his 1833 memoirs Life of Mà-ka-tai-me-she-kià-kiàk, the warrior
Black Hawk (1767–1838) presents a corrective reading of the history of
treaty-making that led to the war that came to bear his name. He recounts
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how in 1804 the US general William Henry Harrison had made a dubious agreement with a Sauk del
e
ga
t ion led by the tribal leader
Quàshquàme: the Sauk delegates were brought to St. Louis u nder false
pretense and pressured to sign a treaty even though they “had been
drunk the greater part of the time” (28–29).12 The resulting treaty ceded
to the United States large territories in present-day Illinois, Missouri, and
Wisconsin and profoundly shaped US-Sauk relations in the decades that
followed.13 A fter the War of 1812, Black Hawk looked to E
 ngland for protection from the United States, and his “British Band” of followers
continuously challenged the fraudulent land seizure and resisted the
encroachment of white homesteaders in the region. When in 1832 Black
Hawk went back east and re-crossed the Mississippi to find the Sauk village of Saukenuk occupied by white settlers, this ushered in a fifteen-
week war between settler volunteers and Black Hawk’s followers from
the Sauk and Meskwaki nations, as well as allies from several other
tribes. William Clark, who served as the superintendent of Indian trade
in St. Louis, showed no tolerance for the British Band and defended what
he called a “war of extermination” against Black Hawk and his followers.14 The Americans ultimately defeated Black Hawk’s forces in the
 attle;
Battle of Bad Axe on August 2, 1832. It was more a massacre than a b
volunteers shot dozens of Native men, women, and children as they tried
to go back west across the Mississippi. Although estimates vary, the
Sauk and their allies suffered between 450 and 600 casualties, opposed
to 77 on the American side.15
Following the war, the tribal leader Keokuk (ca. 1780–1848) was
among the signers of a new treaty that was to shape their history for
years to come. Made up in the presence of the generals Winfield Scott
and John Reynolds, the 1832 treaty stipulated a cession of all Sauk lands
east of the Mississippi, including the principal village of Saukenuk, near
present-day Rock Island, Illinois. While a four hundred square-mile tract
of land on both sides of the Iowa River was to be kept as a reservation,
the treaty proclaimed the remaining Sauk lands opened for settlement beginning in June 1833.16 Black Hawk, meanwhile, was taken to the East
Coast along with four other allied Sauk and Meskwaki leaders. The War
Department held them in Virginia for several weeks before taking them
on a widely publicized tour of major cities, during which they became
popular figures through public events and newspapers coverage.17 When
he was brought back to Rock Island and Keokuk had negotiated his release, Black Hawk entrusted the story of his life and the war to the government translator Antoine LeClaire and the newspaper editor John
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Barton Patterson. First published in Cincinnati in 1833, Black Hawk’s
Life was widely popular in eastern American cities and was reprinted
many times over the next decade.
Although the Life was published for American readers in eastern cities, the book is also a record of US-Indian diplomacy, and its collaborative authorship extended an intertwined networks of tribal leaders,
traders, and government administrators. Black Hawk’s memoirs constitute a translated and transcribed account of an oral performance, and
Timothy Sweet reminds us that the “immediate audience” of this perfor
mance was the American government, “as represented in the person of
the interpreter LeClaire and the physical space of the Rock Island
Agency.”18 Situated at the confluence of the Mississippi and Rock River,
Rock Island was the site of the US military outpost Fort Armstrong,
where the trader Thomas Forsyth served as Indian agent to the Sauk and
Meskwaki people. Forsyth worked closely with George Davenport, who
operated a trading h
 ouse for the American Fur Company (AFC) on the
19
island. Black Hawk’s editors, Patterson and LeClaire, w
 ere part of the
overlapping network of traders and administrators on Rock Island:
Patterson became a clerk for Davenport’s company around the same
time he began publication of the Life, and LeClaire worked not only as
the US government interpreter but also as a trader for Davenport and the
Chouteau Company.20 Traders such as Davenport and LeClaire represented what Francis Paul Prucha calls an “influential and sometimes
dominating third party” in the relations between tribal nations and the
United States government.21 White settlement put pressure on Indian nations to make large land cessions in exchange for annuities, which diminished their access to hunting grounds and animal populations during
their seasonal hunts. The increasing dependence on trading houses for
goods—a nd the diminishing profits of the fur trade—led Indian nations
into debt, and they often paid traders directly from the annuities they
received in exchange for land cessions. By 1825 it became standard practice for the American government to pay traders directly on behalf of
tribal nations, which incentivized traders to become more and more
involved in US-Indian treaty negotiations.22
Reconstructing the events that led up to the war of 1832, Black
Hawk’s Life offers an institutional critique of the imbrication of traders
and Indian agents at Rock Island, implicating LeClaire, Davenport, and
Thomas Forsyth in the mismanagement of Indian affairs. Black Hawk
suggests that although he had long held the door open for negotiations
with the American government, he was never taken seriously as a
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Figure 1. Treaty at Fort Armstrong. Artist’s impression of Fort Armstrong on Rock Island. In Benjamin
Drake, The G
 reat Indian Chief of the West: Or, Life and Adventures of Black Hawk (Cincinnati: H. M.
Rulison, 1855). University of Louisville Special Collections and Archives.

partner in dialogue. Instead, his conversations with Forsyth, LeClaire,
and Davenport only offer a space for the promotion of removal policy:
I visited Rock Island. The agent [Forsyth] again ordered me to quit
my village. He said, that if we did not, troops would be sent to
drive us off. He reasoned with me, and told me, it would be better
for us to be with the rest of our people, so that we might avoid
difficulty, and live in peace. The interpreter [LeClaire] joined him,
and gave me so many good reasons, that I almost wished I had not
undertaken the difficult task that I had pledged myself to my brave
band to perform. (99)
Black Hawk calls on Davenport, who had “long been my friend, but [was]
now amongst those advising me to give up my village” (99). As he is prepared to listen to his “friend,” Black Hawk proves himself less intransigent than his interlocutors, all of whom see Sauk removal as the only
v iable option. Davenport inquires whether Black Hawk would consider
a sum of six thousand dollars to “remove to the west side of the Mississippi” if it were authorized by William Clark, the superintendent of Indian trade at St. Louis. Yet before Black Hawk can make a decision, news
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from St. Louis arrives that Clark “would give us nothing!—a nd said if
we did not remove immediately, we should be drove off!” (100–101).
Black Hawk’s critique suggests that the war was not inevitable but
that the conflict deteriorated due to a structure in which the shared rhe
toric of these different actors (trader, Indian agent, interpreter, and
superintendent) did not offer any space for serious dialogue. As Neil
Schmitz has pointed out, in the narrative the trader, agent, and interpreter are unnamed and “spoken of almost as a single identity, b
 ecause
23
what they say to the Sauks is always the same.” Even the replacement
of the Indian agent Thomas Forsyth did not bring about any changes in
the entrenched rhetoric within this network. In the spring of 1830, having served for eighteen years, Forsyth was dismissed from his serv ice
a fter voicing criticisms of Clark and was replaced by Felix St. Vrain, a
sawmill operator who was only thirty-one years old. 24 Black Hawk
initially imagines that Forsyth’s dismissal might bring about discursive change at Rock Island: “About this time our agent was put out of office. I then thought, if it was for wanting to make us leave our village, it
was right—because I was tired of hearing him talk about it” (101). Black
Hawk, however, finds only a continued lack of dialogue: “The interpreter,
who had been equally as bad in trying to persuade us to leave our village,
was retained in office—a nd the young man who took the place of our
agent, told the same old story over, about removing us” (101). In other
words, despite the appointment of a new Indian agent, the change in
personnel does not bring about any discursive change.
Nevertheless, Black Hawk does not divest from diplomacy altogether, even as he begins to consider military action. At a key moment
in the book, the tribal leader Neapope informs Black Hawk that British
and Potawotami forces w ill come to his aid against the settler volunteers, as foretold by the Winnebago prophet Wabokieshiek. Keokuk, however, tries to convince Black Hawk that he has “been imposed upon by
liars, and had much better remain where I was and keep quiet.” Keokuk
proposes that they ask William Clark for permission to “go to Washington to see our Great Father” and have their “difficulties settled amicably” (111–12). It is only when they hear “nothing favorable from the g reat
chief at St. Louis” that Black Hawk mobilizes his warriors. He notes
that “the peacable disposition of Ke-o -k uck, and his p
 eople” has been
“the cause of our having been driven from our village” and proceeds to
“recruit all my own band” (112).25 Here the narrative seems to present a
clear binary: Black Hawk is action-d riven, leaning toward military
options, and swayed by Native informants, while Keokuk is passive,
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“peacable,” and persuaded by the information from American officials.
Yet even when Black Hawk first decides on military action, he does not
reject the notion of further diplomacy. Once more he reminds his audience that Keokuk urged Davenport to request a diplomatic trip to Washington, but they “received no answer” from his superiors. As interpreted
by Patterson and LeClaire, Black Hawk notes that “every overture had
been made by Ke-o-kuck to prevent difficulty, and I anxiously hoped that
something would be done for my people, that it might be avoided. But
there was bad management somewhere, or the difficulty that has taken
place would have been avoided” (112).26 Black Hawk’s diagnosis of “bad
management” obscures individual accountability, but it also blames the
escalation of the conflict on the Indian Office’s management of information between its different administrators. Black Hawk points out a systemic inefficiency in the communication circuits that linked Keokuk and
Davenport at Rock Island to Clark in St. Louis and the “Great Father” in
Washington. In spite of their shared rhetoric of removal, the disconnect
between the traders and administrators leaves no space for Black
Hawk, Keokuk, or even Davenport to meaningfully influence policy.
Besides its critique of the Black Hawk War, then, the Life reveals
how the entrenched rhetoric of removal policy worked in tandem with
what Ronald Satz terms the “remarkable diffusion of power and decision
making authority from Washington to the field.”27 In its administration
of Indian affairs, the federal government did not represent a far-reaching
hegemonic power but rather a weak imperial node within the triad of colonial government, settlers, and Indian nations.28 This is not to suggest
that Indian removal happened in the absence of federal policy: indeed
the violence of the Black Hawk War was a coordinated exertion of
military power. But the Indian Office’s emphasis on local decision-
making also placed the administration of Indian affairs with locally
stationed individuals who were poorly connected to federal overseers
and other agents.29 This administrative decentralization meant that Indian removal not only depended on federal policy directives but was refracted through local and regional interests. Rather than a monolithic
settler state, Black Hawk engaged a decentered Indian policy that was
filtered through the face-to-face negotiations among tribal leaders,
William Clark, Indian agents, and traders. The Life, then, does not resist diplomacy but inefficient diplomacy; not the management of Indian affairs but the “bad management” of a range of problematically
connected agencies. It is in t hese spaces that Black Hawk offers a co-
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gent critique of the administrative disconnect that marked federal
Indian policy in the early nineteenth c entury.
“Our Wants and Our Wishes”: Keokuk’s Oratory as Institutional Intervention

In its critique of the administration of Indian affairs, Black Hawk’s
Life sees the oratory of the tribal leader Keokuk as a key factor in the
Sauk Nation’s removal from Saukenuk. According to Black Hawk, Keokuk
used his rhetorical skills to discredit him and to foment dissension
among the Sauk: “Ke-o -k uck, who has a smooth tongue, and is a g reat
speaker, was busy in persuading my band that I was wrong—and thereby
making many of them dissatisfied with me” (98–99). Keokuk’s “smooth
tongue” thereby plays an active role in the formation of Sauk factionalism, acceding to pressures from American treaty negotiators to abandon the village of Saukenuk.30 “We were a divided people,” Black Hawk
reflects, “forming two parties, Ke-o -k uck being at the head of one, willing to barter our rights merely for the good opinion of the whites; and
cowardly enough to desert our village to them” (97–98). In light of Black
Hawk’s refusal to remove, Keokuk’s legitimacy as tribal leader is compromised by his complicity in the decision-making of Indian agents, traders, and treaty commissioners. It is no accident, then, that where the
Life is widely read today, Keokuk’s oratory has all but disappeared from
critical review. In studies of Black Hawk’s Life, Keokuk has emerged alternately as a “nonwarrior who repeatedly violates Sauk traditions,” an
“unreliable indicator of popular assent to US claims,” and as one of many
“puppet leaders” who falsely assumed tribal leadership and worked at
the behest of the United States government.31
The lack of critical attention to Keokuk’s oratory, however, risks
overlooking a body of texts that inform us about the role of tribal leaders within bureaucratic discourses during the removal era. His performative interactions in US-I ndian councils asserted the presence of a
Sauk political voice within the loose networks that constituted the Indian
Office. Phillip Round has argued that Indian nations’ participation in
public discourse as a political presence depended on the bureaucratic
structures of the Indian Office. The communication networks of the
Indian Office revealed the “efforts of indigenous nations . . . to construct and perform a public, political Indianness” and constituted what
Round calls a “mixed audience of Native and non-Native auditors in the
public sphere of the early Republic.”32 As a diplomat with frequent access
to colonial administrators, Keokuk had intimate knowledge of the
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workings of the Indian Office and
the protocols of Indian diplomacy.
During the War of 1812 a Sauk
tribal council had first appointed
him as war chief, a fter which he
became “a spokesman for the
tribe with the United States government” and engaged in treaty
councils with Thomas Forsyth and
William Clark as early as 1816.33 In
1824 he took part in a tribal delega
tion to Washington, where he contested the Osages’ sale of lands
in Missouri, arguing successfully
that these lands belonged to the
Sauk “by the same right by which
the United States claimed its land,
by right of conquest.”34 And in the
summer of 1830 Keokuk secured a
thousand dollar payment of trade
goods to compensate for the death
Figure 2. Thomas M. Easterly,
Chief Keokuk aka the Watchful
of several Meskwaki men who had been killed by a Sioux
Fox. Daguerreotype, 1847.
war party. On this occasion Keokuk brought about two
Courtesy of the Missouri History
Museum, St. Louis.
hundred warriors to the grounds of William Clark’s office
in St. Louis, staging a public bodily performance of Sauk
sovereignty to remind Clark that Native nations still had the capability
to insist on the conditions of Indian diplomacy.35
Keokuk’s role in the Indian Office, however, depended on fraught
collaborations with colonial administrators. Like Black Hawk’s Life, his
councils with US administrators were oral performances that w
 ere transcribed and translated by government interpreters—most frequently
Antoine LeClaire—a nd shaped by the colonial logics and limited options
of US Indian policy.36 One of his most frequent interlocutors was William
Clark, the superintendent of Indian trade in St. Louis. Clark’s influence
in this capacity ranged widely: he controlled Indian agents, issued licenses and passports, provided payments for injuries and injustices, arrested and punished lawbreakers, surveyed bounda ries, distributed
annuities, and conducted treaty councils.37 As Jay Buckley observes,
Clark’s importance in the region was such that American Indian leaders
often deemed treaties invalid u nless they w
 ere conducted with Clark
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personally.38 Keokuk’s councils with Clark negotiated between the need
to assert a politicized Sauk voice, and the Indian Office’s ideological
translation of his speech acts. In the spring of 1830, while conflicts between Black Hawk’s “British Band” and white settlers intensified, Keokuk
met with Clark to propose a delegation of Sauk leaders to Washington.39
Clark had recommended the delegation to the US War Department, but
he informed Keokuk that his superiors wished “to know more about
it.” Keokuk, however, refused to give Clark further details u
 ntil he
could meet in council with other Sauk and Meskwaki leaders. His silence pushed Clark to enumerate Keokuk’s goals in his place:
You want peace among yourselves with your neighbors . . . You
want to be settled . . . a nd to be by yourselves, that you may rise as
a Nation. You want an enlargement of your annuities, so that you
may be enabled to help yourselves in your new establishments.
You are harassed with debts & you wish to be extricated from
those which are now hanging over you. You are dissatisfied with
the sale made of your lands many years since because it was not
understood by the nation. You want it well understood by every
one. You also want to do something to unite the British party with
your own & to bring both Tribes of Sacs & Foxes together, so as to
be strong and respectable as a Nation. And you think if you could
get rid of spirituous liquors from among you, your happiness &
comfort could be effected . . . Have I not guessed pretty nearly
your wants? 40
Signing off on this list, Keokuk responded that Clark “described exactly
our wants & our wishes.” 41
Keokuk’s silence indicates that he occupied a position where he was
not purely suppliant to Clark: he effectively forced the superintendent
to adopt a Sauk political perspective and enumerate the many problems
and crises that indigenous nations w
 ere facing. Still, with Keokuk assenting to Clark’s projection of his political motivations, this stylized speech
act also elaborated an American bureaucratic interpretation of Keokuk’s
demands. For instance, Keokuk assented to Clark’s proposal to “bring
both Tribes of Sacs & Foxes together, so as to be strong and respectable
as a Nation.” This controversial move to treat with the Sauk and Meskwakis as one nation (reaffirmed in the Treaty of 1832) streamlined Indian
diplomacy but also ignored the Meskwaki’s sovereign status as a separate nation.42 Moreover, in a separate council, Clark recommended to
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Keokuk the strategy of paying off their tribal debts through land
cessions:
As we are now in private council, I w ill give you my opinion (my
private opinion, & that from the Govt) of what you should do. You
should offer to sell to the Government a piece of your land on the
Mississippi for the purpose of enlarging your annuities, to enable
you to pay your debts, & to assist you in farming . . . Should it
succeed it w ill be the only means of keeping together all your
people, by applying with effect for the general benefit whatever
means the nation should possess.43
Clark’s projection of Keokuk’s “wants” and “wishes,” then, was also an
act of colonial translation, making Keokuk’s politics legible in a situation that was s haped by the superintendent’s own political projects.
Furthermore, he capitalized on the interpersonal dimensions of Indian diplomacy, reiterating that these were his “private opinions, as
your friend, not being authorized thereto by the Government.” 44 But
what made the council “private” all of the sudden? The interpreter was
still t here, the talk was written down and circulated (and archived) in
the Indian Office, and Clark advised Keokuk on matters of public interest. Indeed, the categories of “public” and “private” fail to describe
the context of t hese diplomatic interactions: the Indian Office was a
loose network of indigenous and settler participants in councils and
treaties, and the reliance of Indian diplomacy on face-to-face communications allowed administrators like Clark a significant measure of
autonomy.45
Through the intimate dimensions of Indian diplomacy, however,
Native leaders also claimed a significant measure of institutional agency,
and Keokuk took up collaborative forms of writing to inflect US policy.
He repeatedly charged the Indian Office with a failure to uphold the
agreements made in treaties and outlined the r ipple effects of white settlement in the Mississippi River Valley. In 1830 Keokuk criticized the
Indian Office’s failure to uphold the agreements of the treaty council at
Prairie du Chien five years earlier. At the 1825 treaty council commissioners had negotiated peace and a reconfiguration of tribal borders with
representatives from the Sioux, Sauk, Meskwaki, Menominee, Ioway,
Winnebago, Ojibwe, Ottawa, and Potawatomi nations.46 In subsequent
years, however, white settlement put pressure on the neutral hunting
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grounds, which led to frequent violent conflicts between hunters from
the Sioux and the Sauk and Meskwaki nations. At a council with William
Clark in the summer of 1830, Keokuk therefore voiced his refusal to attend a new upcoming treaty council at Prairie du Chien in July of that
year, due to the recent murder of Peahmuska, one of the Meskwaki signers of the 1825 treaty. Peahmuska had been invited by an Indian agent
to come to Prairie du Chien on official business but was killed by an
enemy war party on the way:
My Father: We have never before refused you anything, you have
always said true (ever had your own way) but now we cannot
go . . . I am firm and immovable in my determination not to go to
Prairie du Chien . . . My Father: I now tell you from the bottom of
my heart that I cannot go to Prairie du Chien & hope I w
 ill say
true, and have my way in my turn, for once. I am done.47
Keokuk’s decided tone signals a moment when the conversational back-
and-forth of his councils became an uncompromising statement of an
absolute position. Keokuk asked, “How is it possible for our people to
go to P. du Chien? When [Peahmuska] went to Washington the President
gave him a Flag, a medal & some other t hings; when he was going to
P. du Chien he took t hese things with him to show who & what he was,
but he was fallen upon by murderers, and his flag, Your Flag, the Flag of
the United States was trod u
 nder foot & then burned.” 48 Keokuk’s rhetorical question directly communicated a political situation that was no
longer tenable. By evoking the flag and medal that Peahmuska had received in Washington, he challenged the meaning of such symbols in
light of the inability of the United States to provide the protections
that it had promised.
In his own way, then, Keokuk, too, offered a critique of the treaty
system, questioning the legitimacy and practical use of Indian diplomacy
if the agreements they established had l ittle meaning on the ground. In
doing so he maneuvered Clark into a response that laid bare the limitations of the Indian Office. Clark explained that the death of Peahmuska
resulted from what he called the “bad management” of Indian affairs
around Prairie du Chien. He explained that the Indian agent who had invited Peahmuska “was ignorant of Indian affairs,” thinking that “one or
two chiefs could make a peace for both your Tribes.” Moreover, he explained that Peahmuska was “killed at an unfortunate time for his people
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& by bad management they w
 ere deceived.” 49 As in Black Hawk’s Life,
the lack of specificity in this “bad management” registers a bureaucratic
discourse in which agency and accountability 
were muddled. But
Keokuk’s intervention did push Clark to explain that the invitation leading to Peahmuska’s death was “from a different power than that of a
Sub Agent,” coming from a French fur trader of the Mackinac Company
at Prairie du Chien.50 As Clark acknowledged his own office’s inability
to control the opaque roles of Indian agents and traders in a world of
intertribal and imperial rivalries, Keokuk’s performative interactions
identified the mismanagement of Indian affairs on the part of colonial
administrators.
Over the following years, as conflicts with the Sioux intensified,
Keokuk repeatedly addressed the failures of the reorganization of Indian
country, but he did not see the issue addressed by Clark or other administrators. In 1832, along with seven other Sauk and Meskwaki tribal leaders, he collaborated on a letter to Clark that outlined recent conflicts
with the Eastern Dakota, identified in the Indian Office records as the
“Sioux.”51 Pointing out that the Sioux “advanced within our bounda ries
seventy miles,” they insisted the US government “take such measures as
w ill oblige the Sioux to keep within their own limits, for without this, it
is impossible for a peace to last.”52 Two years l ater Keokuk sat in council with General Henry Atkinson, the military commander at Jefferson
Barracks near St. Louis. He implicated the Sioux agent’s involvement in
the deterioration of intertribal relations, arguing that the “Sioux Agent
and trader . . . advise the Sioux to go on the Sac land and hunt.” He argued that whereas the Indian agent and trader to the Sauk went “the
straight road” and advised them “to keep back on our own land,” the
trader and agent of the Sioux told them “to go any where they can find
game.”53 Settler expansion and Indian removal thus played out in a complex intertribal geography; Keokuk found himself caught between, on the
one hand, the demands of Sauk and Meskwaki warriors who wanted him
to enter into battle with the Sioux, and on the other hand, directives from
Clark to preserve peace—but without any commitment from the Indian
Office to make that attainable.
Given this difficult diplomatic position, Keokuk’s oratory displaced
the more fundamental problem of white settler expansion onto the crisis of their conflicts with the Sioux. He explained to Atkinson that his
long-standing request—for American administrators to regulate a changing world of intertribal borders and relations—had systematically been
ignored by various colonial administrators:
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Our G
 reat Father the President had us all gather together at
Prairie-du-Chien three different times to talk to us—a nd every
time I expressed my wish that the Commissioners sent by the
 ere not to
President could make known to the Sioux’s that they w
come on our land . . . last fall a year ago when Genl Scott made a
treaty with us I requested him to tell the Sioux’s to keep off our
land—last spring I came to see Genl Clark and repeated the same
words to him—a nd came here and repeated the same words to
you.54
Keokuk documented the discrepancies between the promises made in
treaties and the repeated failures to address the social upheavals caused
by the reorganization of Indian country. By 1834, however, he also came
to directly critique the encroachment of white Americans onto Sauk
lands. That year he collaborated with three other tribal leaders—
Pashepaho, Wawk-k um-mee, and Pia-tshe-noay—on a letter to William
Clark to protest the presence of white hunters in Sauk country. Since
they had received “no satisfactory answer” from the Indian agent about
this matter, they took “recourse to this paper”—a nd to the interpreter
Francois Labussier—to inform Clark that t here were “white p
 eople hunting on our land since last fall and their intention is to remain all this
winter and the next spring.”55 Again they critiqued the lack of accountability in the networks of the Indian Office, noting that they had “informed our father the Agent of our Tribes of it. But we received no
satisfactory answer.” Appealing to Clark’s sense of “justice” and “benevolence,” they insisted the Indian Office “remedy our right that is v iolated
by the White peoples.”56
Keokuk, then, was a more vocal critic of US Indian policy than his
dismissal as a “puppet leader” allows. This does not mean, of course, that
Keokuk undid the colonial logics and policies of these networks; by the
same token his consistent participation in t hese diplomatic interactions
reflects how the Indian Office co-opted the work of tribal leaders to
accommodate American policy goals. Keokuk’s speech acts were
constrained by the political projections of US administrators—Clark,
Davenport, Street, and LeClaire—and ultimately did not resist the Indian
Office’s promotion of Sauk removal. However, as the Sauk and Meskwaki
nations faced the pressures of land encroachment and the erosion of
their pol itical sovereignty, t hese fraught collaborations also reveal an
important attempt to find new routes within colonial governmental networks, to secure a critical, politicized Native voice within them.
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“White Hard Money”: Economic Policy and Tribal Futures in Keokuk’s
Oratory

Seen alongside Black Hawk’s Life, Keokuk’s speeches are a reminder
that Sauk removal was not limited to the events of the Black Hawk War,
as they point to a longer history of land theft and bureaucratic mismanagement that eroded the Sauk and Meskwaki’s claim to place. Beyond
the direct physical violence of the war, they dealt with the limitations of
a diplomatic apparatus that tried and in many ways failed to manage the
upheavals caused by white settlement.57 If Indian nations were not,
strictly, “internal” to the US settler state, Indian diplomacy was nevertheless shaped by the actions of a settler government that sought to secure Indian “pacification” by means of financial policy and the remapping
of borders.
As Keokuk navigated this bureaucracy to secure a political Sauk
voice within it, it is worth noting that his oratory expressed little distrust of the translated and written word. Rather, Keokuk recognized that
the Sauk Nation had moved into a new situation where the written word
was now central to the negotiation of US-Indian relations, and he embraced translation and transcription as techniques to prevent the inauspicious manipulation of spoken language. He repeatedly insisted that
his words be written down on paper, to be sent to the American president in Washington. In council with General Henry Atkinson in 1834,
Keokuk explained that “in shaking hands with you we shake hands with
the G
 reat Father the President. What we say to you now we wish you to
put down on paper, so that the president may know what we have said
to you.”58 And at a council with the Indian agent Joseph Street, Keokuk
requested he “send this talk to the President of the US and ask him
to send us an answer by you in the Spring.”59 Imagining that the written
record of his oral communications would reach the “Great Father” in
Washington, he saw written documents as holding the potential to be
passed on in a reliable, routinized way. Relying on the pen as much as
his own “smooth tongue,” he believed that “when you make treaties, you
put them on paper and the paper cannot lie.” 60
His investment in the constancy of the written word was an implicit
criticism of Americans’ disregard for treaties. For Keokuk, only the complementary use of oratory and writing could make any council politi
cally valuable, and he saw the potential of written documents not as
deception but accountability. Although his own words were subject
to colonial mistranslation, creating these written documents meant
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e stablishing a material record of the failures of (oral) communications
within the Indian Office. But to do so he had to rely on the available resources and collaborators within the US bureaucracy. For instance, the
work of the government translator Antoine LeClaire was key in establishing this written record, and when in August 1834 an act of Congress
threatened to reduce his pay, Keokuk protested the move:
This Man is our Interpreter, we have long used him, he speaks our
language well, and when we want to speak to our F
 ather we know
he w ill get all say correctly, and that that what is said to us w
 ill be
truly repeated. We have great confidence in him for he never
deceived us. He now tells us you have reduced his pay so much
that he w ill not be able to Interpret for what you offer him any
longer . . . We are very sorry for this. For we can have no other
Interpreter but this man.61
Keokuk’s statement reflects the duality of his position. On one level, he
was working in the interest of the Indian agent, traders, and translator
at Rock Island; on another level he defended the need for the Sauk
Nation to retain a voice in the negotiations between tribal leaders and
the Indian Office. Yet he emphasized the importance of placing Sauk national interests above US financial considerations, arguing, “We have no
confidence that our talk, and yours, would be truly understood . . . if this
man is not by to talk between us. We hope our Great Father w
 ill consider this and . . . not deprive my Nation of their interpreter to save a l ittle
money.” 62 Keokuk’s support of LeClaire reflected his dependence on existing resources in these bureaucratic settings to retain a measure of
control over their representation within scenes of Indian diplomacy.
Keokuk’s diplomacy, then, did not only critique the workings of the
Indian Office but sought to continue its operations to make them work
positively for tribal-national economic and political goals. In the course
of the 1830s Keokuk tethered this to the question of how annuity payments w
 ere made to the Sauk and Meskwaki nations. By 1834 t here had
emerged disagreement among tribal members and chiefs over w
 hether
annuities should be paid to tribal leaders to redistribute them or directly
to individual families. As Michael Green explains, prior to that year t here
had not been a fixed policy: some annuities w
 ere paid in money and some
in goods; some were made to the chiefs and others were made to the heads
of individual families. In 1834 Congress investigated a new organization
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of Indian policy regarding annuity payments: while it recommended
payments to the chiefs, it was still possible to authorize individual
payments if the tribe wished it.63 Keokuk had argued in 1833 that payments to tribal leaders w
 ere already sanctioned by the principal chiefs.
He asked, “When any thing happens between us & the whites or between us & other Indians, to whom do you apply? . . . W hen difficulties
are to be settled, treaties to be held, or any business of consequence to
be transacted, you apply to the Chiefs . . . The annuities should be paid
in the old way—a ll concerned w ill be benefitted by it.” 64 For Keokuk
this prior practice—rooted in the traditional role of tribal leaders as
redistributing goods—legitimized the disbursement to the civil chiefs,
and the practice continued to be followed throughout the 1830s.
This practice became highly controversial and led to accusations of
undue control over tribal funds, and Keokuk laid out several defenses
for his decision. First, he insisted that the annuities should be paid to
“one or two” of the principal chiefs to ensure social security for those in
need:
Sometimes a considerate Indian comes to the Chiefs, and states
that a poor family are suffering for Provisions or clothing, the
Chief then has to buy and give to them. Old men who cannot hunt,
old women who cannot work, or find support have to be fed &
clothed by the heads of the nations, and if the Chiefs have no more
means to afford the required relief, than others, the helpless and
miserable must suffer.65
Second, Keokuk argued that the centralized payment would be a means
to preserve peace with other Indian nations, as it enabled the chiefs to
pay off warriors who might otherw ise go to war in retaliation. He explained to William Clark, “In case of the deaths of a brave . . . the Chiefs
can buy the necessary articles to bury him. It is also the only means
which the Chiefs have of turning back a war party of young men—by
paying them.” 66 Keokuk found himself managing a transition from an
older political economy—shaped by the redistribution of goods and the
political agency of young warriors—to a new reality that was shaped by
the economic relations among tribal nations, white settlers, and traders.
Envisioning the annuity payments as a collective resource for a mea
sure of social stability, Keokuk held that one of the most immediate
problems facing the Sauks and Meskwakis was the economic assault
on Indian country. By working through the Indian Office he elaborated
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an economic policy that was aimed at “tribal economic solvency through
small land cessions,” in an attempt to avoid the complete loss of Sauk
and Meskwaki lands and removal from Iowa.67 Managing tribal debts
was key in this effort. Ever since Thomas Jefferson’s administration, US
policymakers had pushed the idea of leading Indian nations into debt to
make them “favorably disposed to extinguishing their debts through land
cessions.” 68 To secure a f uture place for Indian nations therefore demanded a coherent vision of economic exchange and financial policy;
receiving the annuity payments on a collective basis was a potential
means to retain control over economic policy, reduce tribal debts, and
prevent f uture land cessions.
But besides his arguments for centralized distribution to the chiefs,
Keokuk also insisted that the annuity payments be made in specie, as
was stipulated in their treaties with the United States. In 1837 Keokuk
sat in council with the Indian agent Joseph Street and Captain Edward
Hitchcock, the disbursement officer to the governor of Wisconsin Territory, and he addressed the rumors going around that the annuities were
going to be paid in goods instead of what Keokuk called “white hard
money.” Since the tribal leaders had promised to pay their traders in
cash, receiving the annuities in goods would have put them in a difficult
position. Similar to his insistence on a written record of US-Indian negotiations, Keokuk’s call for “white hard money” was materially linked
to the American government’s obligations as written down in treaties:
I have been present at every treaty made with the Sac and Fox
Nations, and they promise to pay for our lands in white hard
money. Since we came h
 ere, we are told we are not to get money,
but goods. Our promise to our trader is to pay money, and goods
w ill not pay one money . . . W hen you bought our lands, we did not
 ere yours to do what you
ask what you would do with them, they w
pleased with them. We are told you have no more white hard
money and c an’t pay money. We want money to pay to different
people to whom we have given our promises, and we desire to be
faithful.69
It may be easy to see why Keokuk is not as widely read as Black Hawk,
but his criticism was clear: Keokuk’s object was US accountability for the
agreements they had made. “We sold you one land, and you promised to
pay us hard money for it,” Keokuk reminded the Indian agent. “We moved
off the land, and will abide by our Treaty, and so we hope will you.”70
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Of course, Keokuk’s critique failed to disrupt the colonial logics
 ehind the treaty system, which translated Sauk and Meskwaki lands
b
into a salable commodity. And his insistence that tribal leaders receive
the annuity payments in cash has been dismissed by adversaries as a
means to pocket the annuities to pay his “friends” at the trading houses,
the American Fur Company and the Chouteau Company.71 Yet the trading houses were a problematic but necessary component of a tribal economy that was based in a combination of trade, horticulture, and the
winter hunt, or “seasonal round.” Keokuk’s catering to the traders reflected his people’s slide into dependency and perhaps even the opportunism of tribal leaders, but it was also vitally important to keep up these
trade relation. Removed from their homelands and experiencing rapid
historical change, the Sauk and Meskwakis depended on the trading
houses for a constant access to information, goods, and credit. The decline of the bison and game population had made their winter hunts less
lucrative than in the past, and the encroachment of white settlers led to
fewer neutral hunting grounds, making it harder to hunt without g reat
risk of conflict.72 In the midst of t hese disruptions, the traders represented crucial access to a variety of goods. Keokuk was perhaps naively dependent on them—all the more since American expansion thrived
on promulgating tribal debts—but to maintain positive relations with
traders was an important link in their economy. The trading h
 ouses extended credit for the necessary supplies to continue the seasonal round
and keep the traditional economic organization alive into the end of the
decade.73
Rather than only an opportunistic catering to traders, Keokuk’s insistence on cash payments mattered especially in 1837, when a financial
panic drastically changed economic relations. In May that year banks
in New York had suspended specie payments at full face value, leading
the United States into a long-term economic depression. The panic halted
the influx of settlers in the west, and coins became virtually impossible
to come by in the western territories.74 As specie flooded out of the territories, Indian nations receiving cash payments became the only entities for miles around that had access to specie in a “nearly cashless
world.”75 Susan Gray has argued that the panic of 1837 and the ensuing
economic depression made the reassertion of economic exchange
with white settlers a key factor in Native p
 eople’s attempts to “claim a
social and physical place” in the Midwest.76 The crisis made it more
appealing for settlers to keep Indian nations around longer, and their
treaty-stipulated access to specie meant leverage in a society that was
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economically being reconfigured by the panic. Seen in this light, Keokuk’s
insistence on cash payments could be import ant for establishing the
Sauk and Meskwaki nations as a permanent presence in Iowa: their access to cash allowed for the possibility that they might become an eco
nomically stable influence in the region, making Indian removal an
unattractive policy to white settlers in a region where coins w
 ere few
and far between. Seeing the centrality of debts as a key factor in the vulnerability of Indian nations, Keokuk projected a situation beyond tribal
debts, in which commercial relations with American traders would help
tribal nations to carve out a less fragile position in a region that had been
opened up for white settlement.
Unfortunately, Keokuk’s vision proved to be a long shot. The annuity controversy was resolved without creating lasting political divisions: the annuities to the Sauk and Meskwakis w
 ere paid to the tribal
chiefs as usual in 1840, split between the chiefs and families in 1841,
and paid entirely to heads of families in 1842. But as divisive as the annuity controversy had been, the various factions united in 1841 over the
political question of removal.77 At the 1841 payments US commissioners
pushed for the Sauk and Meskwaki nations to remove to present-day
Minnesota, and Keokuk was widely supported in halting this scheme.
But as the nations did not manage to achieve tribal solvency, and their
tribal debts started to exceed annuity payments by 1842, they were
forced to remove to western Iowa in 1843 and to Indian Territory four
years later.78
The history of Sauk removal thus extended well beyond the crisis
of the Black Hawk War, to the prohibitive pressures of white settlement
and removal policy to bureaucratic mismanagement and tribal debts.
Within this history Keokuk’s oratory played an ambiguous part. On the
one hand, he tried to make the colonial legacy of the treaty system work
toward securing a more permanent presence for the Sauk and Meskwaki
nations, in a region that was undergoing rapid historical change. On the
other hand, Keokuk’s participation in this diplomacy also perpetuated
the problematic workings of US bureaucratic networks. It would be easy,
therefore, to see Keokuk as the anti–Black Hawk—the accommodationist tribal leader who sold out to the settler state and white traders. A fter
all, his oratory presents something that is often seen as a problem for
literary and historical scholarship: the idea that agency can also mean
the effort to keep t hings going as they are. But for Keokuk, maintaining the status quo also meant a political voice within settler networks,
and the continuation of a traditional economy based in redistribution
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and the seasonal round, a social system that was closely embedded in
Sauk cultural and political life, however difficult it proved to maintain.
This is not to suggest, of course, that Keokuk got it “right.” His policies did not stave off further removal, he assented to treaties that signed
away Sauk lands, and he took a side in the annuity debate that kept tribal
funds out of reach from individual families. In this sense, the critique of
Keokuk in Black Hawk’s Life of Mà-ka-tai-me-she-kià-kiàk logically invites critical reflections along the tropes of resistance and accommodation, casting Black Hawk as the conquered warrior-hero and Keokuk as
the opportunistic sycophant to whites. As Thomas Burnell Colbert reminds us, “Americans traditionally have focused their attention on Native American leaders who opposed federal officials through armed
resistance, glamorizing ‘war chiefs’ who led brave but futile military actions against the United States.”79 Yet the conceptual clarity of Keokuk
as a “puppet leader” at the behest of the United States government obscures the critical work that his oratory also performed. Neither Black
Hawk’s nor Keokuk’s publications can be fully understood outside the
context of US-Indian diplomacy and its complex overlay of policy, trade,
and indigenous critique—these were the institutional contexts of Native
writing and oratory. Critical attention to the ways indigenous writing
was shaped by the protocols and idiosyncrasies of Indian diplomacy will
help to understand the rhetorical and intellectual work of tribal leaders
who operated in compromising colonial situations. As Matt Cohen
writes, “Indigenous media worlds have always been multifaceted, multiformal, multimedia worlds of meaning-making,” and the publications
of Black Hawk and Keokuk extended a long tradition of cross-cultural
communication into new institutional domains.80 These compromising
textual collaborations both critiqued and sustained a bureaucracy whose
structural mismanagement exacerbated the fragile position of Indian nations in a region that was undergoing dramatic change. Their critiques
reflect the limited choices imposed by settler expansion and the treaty
system, but to claim a place in the networks where policy was made and
contested mattered then as it does today.
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